Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,

thank you for this opportunity to discuss Kosovo with you.

It is a privilege to appear with Senator Dole, who has been a consistent

voice of realism and conscience in this very sad continuing

story of the end of Yugoslavia.

Senator Biden, I have also read your statement a few days ago,

and that was a very excellent piece of work.

I want to discuss the Kosovo current situation and what I think

we should do. I am not going to discuss U.S. policy because it is

not clear to me what U.S. policy is. The rhetoric on it changes

every day.

And I will try to be brief. I would like first to make a number

of points which I think need to be kept in mind when looking at

this issue. First, we all have enormous trouble sorting out the competing

demands of history, sovereignty, self-determination, justice,

and stability.

For example, Bosnia was a State in 1992, a new State, not as

old as modern Serbia, in which ethnic groups were intermingled

and Bosnian Serbs made up 35 to 40 percent of the population. Because

of the massive support of the Yugoslav National Army, the

Bosnian Serbs were allowed to forcibly carve out and win implicit

international recognition at Dayton for a virtually independent

State within Bosnia.

The Albanians of Kosovo who make up 90 percent of the region

have been denied such an opportunity in great part because they

do not yet have the arms.

Similarly, second, a question: Who are the terrorists? Mr.

Milosevic says they are the Albanian separatists. Many in the West

seem to go along with that judgment. They put the rebel movement

that is fighting a brutal apartheid on a lower moral footing than

Mr. Milosevic’s State terrorism.

Mr. Milosevic, of course, has been responsible, as we have heard,

or largely responsible in the past 10 years for the imposition of a

virtual police State in Kosovo and Bosnia, with the deaths of hundreds

of thousands, the displacement of millions, and the empowerment

and support of war criminals.

He is perceived now as carrying out his rightful authority as the

president of Serbia. He is not a candidate for the American terrorist

list.

The stakes in Kosovo are great. Senator Dodd, you brought them

up. The future of Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Albania,

and perhaps a wider area including Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

For Americans, a particular concern is the stability of Bosnia,

where we have 8,000 troops, and which could be seriously threatened,

the stability of which could be seriously threatened by what

happens in Kosovo.

Conceivably also Mr. Milosevic may use his influence among Bosnian

Serbs to threaten us on Kosovo. He could probably bring down

Mr. Dodek. The enormity of the stakes does not appear to make it

easier for western nations to know what to do. NATO is divided.

The U.S. Government is again split, and the Russians have their

own views.

Mr. Milosevic is well aware of this, and he has shown a capacity

to take advantage of our differences to spurn western demands.

Fourthly, there is a wild card here, and that is the stability of

the Milosevic regime. He is leading his already destitute country

down a blind alley in Kosovo. He faces a mini-revolt in Montenegro,

and even the Hungarians in Vojvodina are getting restive over the

war in Kosovo and seeing their sons go to that war. Some analysts

his hold on his own faithful may be weakening.

Military morale—the military have largely been kept out of the

Kosovo war to date—is by all accounts bad. Few in Serbia would

regret his departure, but it would raise plenty of uncertainties for

Kosovo and other Balkan issues.

Finally, the parties in this issue cannot solve this problem by

themselves. The West will have to be involved in some fashion for

a long time to come if we are going to maintain peace in that part

of the world.

Now, let me try to summarize briefly what I think are the main

elements of the current situation. First, the violence started because

after many years of a nonviolent policy by the Albanians

there was no change in their situation in Kosovo. We told them to

be quiet and we will improve the situation, but nothing happened.

Many Albanians came to believe that only violence would produce

serious western help.

That violence is continuing and I would guess it is likely to escalate.

It is not on the order of Bosnia, and not likely, soon, to become

so, since Kosovar Albanians have few large weapons and little military

organization or experience.

Some believe that the casualty figures, 300 or so, are understated.

Some think they are exaggerated. I do not know.

Having destroyed Albanian villages along the Albanian-Kosovo

border, the Serbs seem now focused on sealing the border and preventing

refugees. They fear more refugees will be the only trigger

for a western military response.

So far—this is very important—the fighting has not expanded to

the populous areas of Kosovo adjoining Macedonia. That could well

happen, could well happen soon, bringing both a humanitarian crisis

and big trouble for Macedonia if there is an outflow of refugees.

Few had heard of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA, a year

ago. Now they have a Web site. The violent Serb attacks against

KLA areas this year have done much to generate support for the

KLA in Kosovo and abroad.

The leadership of Mr. Rugova has been seriously weakened, perhaps

fatally. Albanians are increasingly rallying to the banner of

the KLA and many in Kosovo now openly demonstrate shouting,

UJK, which is the Albanian initials for it.

Some Albanians are thirsting for revenge against the Serbs after

these many years of Serb rule. The KLA is in effective control of

a large portion of Kosovo. We still know little about them, their

size, their capabilities, their leadership, and their organization.

The KLA probably believes that more violence will produce western

military actio against Serbia. Regrettably, there are reports

that they are now targeting Serb civilians and driving them out of

Kosovo. If that is true, it could well land them on the terrorist list.

Western diplomacy over the past 5 months has not stopped the

violence and has failed to produce any political change in Kosovo.

The only way Serbia can continue to rule in Kosovo is either

through continuing greater repression or by moving massive numbers

of Serbs into Kosovo, or driving massive numbers of Albanians

out of Kosovo.

The Kosovo Albanians are fed up with Serb rule, and it is unlikely

they will allow themselves to continue to be ruled by Belgrade

for much longer. Whether that means independence now remains

to be seen. In any event, the status quo is thoroughly unacceptable.

The question now is whether the situation in Kosovo can be

changed without more violence, which gets out of control and

radicalizes all Albanians, including those in Macedonia.

Progress toward ending the violence in Kosovo requires in my

view at least two things. First, an immediate Serb stand-down in

their military campaign, but this has to be coupled with 2) a concrete

offer and an urgent implementation of serious political

change in Kosovo.

Now, how can we achieve those two things, and they may be insufficient.

Here I think are some of the options.

First, the West can label the KLA as terrorists and close the border,

help close the Albanian border to them, while at the same time

insisting that Milosevic accompany these moves with a cessation of

fighting, immediate political change in Kosovo, and serious negotiations

with the Albanians. Many believe U.S policy is headed in that

direction.

Second, we can take a chance on the fighting not escalating too

much, being a low-intensity war for a couple of years, and wait for

Mr. Milosevic to fall, changing the whole equation.

Third, and alternatively, we can threaten Mr. Milosevic that we

will destroy much of his military establishment if he refuses to halt

the military campaign and immediately offer real political change

in Kosovo.

Frankly, it is hard to avoid the judgment that, despite the tough

rhetoric, NATO is reluctant to use force, and I do not think they

will use force unless there are many more refugees coming from

Kosovo, particularly coming into Macedonia.

Fourth, if we are unwilling to use force, we can make it clear to

Milosevic that if he is not prepared to stop the violence and make

quick and serious political change in Kosovo, immediate political

change, we will do everything we can to bring him down, including

supporting the KLA. Obviously, if he agrees we have to pressure

the Albanians to stop the violence.

There is no longer any easy answer, if there ever was one. The

situation gets worse and worse and, in fact, neither the West nor

Milosevic knows what to do.

My own prescription is as follows. This is the best I can do. First,

western diplomacy cannot continue to dawdle. It is imperative to

stop the violence now before we have a permanent war, the elimination

of the nonviolent Albanian leadership, refugees into Macedonia,

and a radicalization of Albanians throughout the Balkans.

This will not be achieved simply by putting pressure on the

weaker party, the Albanians, and hoping that Milosevic will deliver

something. The KLA will not go quietly, and we will be accused of

perfidy of the worst sort. Political change in Kosovo cannot follow

years down the pike. It has to come now. Unconditional negotiations

in this case are a myth. They could last for years. You have

to have change now.

The basic fact is that right now, whether we like it or not,

Milosevic remains in control and it is his call whether there is

going to be war or peace. I would point out that he has never, since

the Bosnian war, began, taken any politically difficult actions unless

he is under great pressure. I suspect he will do the same in

Kosovo.

We are not likely to get Serb agreement at this point to simply

remove their forces, since it would lead to Albanian control of

Kosovo and the exodus of the remaining 180,000 or so Serbs. We

must make contact with KLA, get to know them, and try to influence

them.

Their attacks on Serb civilians and efforts to drive the Serbs out

of Kosovo must be stopped. We need to bring them seriously into

any negotiation. Peace can no longer be achieved without their participation.

I believe the Albanians should begin immediately forming a coalition

Government made up of all political groupings within Kosovo.

This could accelerate political change in Kosovo and may contribute

to unfreezing the current gridlock.

If NATO refuses to persuade Milosevic to make the right moves,

and that seems quite possible, he must be pressured to do so either

through force or through support of the KLA.

Western forces must be involved in the implementation of any

settlement. These are not self-enforcing settlements. Independence

may ultimately take place whatever our current rhetoric against it,

but insistence on it now I believe is likely to be a formula for continued

violence.

That is my best shot at it, Senators.

What I was trying to convey, Senator,

is that we are really in a terrible situation. The alternatives are

very difficult. They may not be successful. But if we do nothing, if

we do not stop the violence and we do not change immediately the

political situation in Kosovo, fundamental change, we will see escalation

of the war with all sorts of ramifications, and I basically had

a variety of points—I am sorry. Let me back track.

I listed a certain number of things we could do to approach this,

but I came myself to a proposal which I thought, and I say this

with very great humility because it is very hard, I thought best

met the situation, and it was sort of like an eight point—or I do

not know how many here, but let me briefly for you just sort of

summarize them quickly.

First, that we cannot continue to let our diplomacy dawdle. We

are dawdling. This has been going on for 5 months, and it is not

getting any better. It is getting worse, and if we do not stop the

violence we are going to have a permanent war. It may be low-level

right now, but it could spread, and it could spread to other parts

of Kosovo, and that would impact on the situation particularly in

Macedonia.

If we saw sizable numbers of refugees moving from Kosovo to

Macedonia, it would be a terrible blow to the stability of that State.

I said second we are not going to do this by putting pressure on

the Albanians, they are the weaker party, and hoping that somehow

or another, after we put pressure on the Albanians, that

Milosevic is going to deliver a solution. The Albanians will not accept

that, and it is—I think it is morally odious.

The fact is that Milosevic is in control, and he has the power to

make peace or war now, and I am not sure he is willing to do so.

It has never been h is wont to do steps which are politically dangerous.

In the end, I honestly believe that the West may have to say, this

is a solution, and this is what you have to do.

I do not believe we can get the Serbs to remove their forces. I

do believe they ought to remove their police forces, but if they removed

all their forces, Kosovo would revert quickly to control of the

KLA and the elimination of all Serbs.

I think we have got to get in contact with the KLA. We have got

to get to know them. They are an essential part of the solution

now. They are a major factor, and we need to bring them into negotiations.

I believe the Albanians, in order to unfreeze the situation, should

start to create a coalition Government, get all the political parties,

political groupings, and set up a concerted political effort.

Now, the key, if Milosevic is unwilling to do those two things, 1)

stop the violence and make immediate changes in Kosovo—and the

two in my view are interrelated. You cannot stop the violence and

then take 12 or 20 months to start negotiating something. That is

not acceptable any more, and the Albanians will not accept that.

If he refuses to do that, then I think we have to either pressure

him with a threat and the use of force, not something anybody particularly

likes, or we have to make it clear to him that we will do

our best to unseat him and we will support the Kosovar Liberation

Army.

I also believe this is a long-term effort. We may have to have

western forces to police the settlement. I do not think you can have

a settlement last without that, at least certainly for the first few

years.

I also believe that finally, while independence may eventually

take place, it is probably likely, given the demographics and what

has happened over the last 10 years, I believe the effort to insist

on it right now is a formula for continued violence.

So in essence I believe we have to proceed down a continuum.

That is the best I can do, as I said before.

I was talking about a coalition among

the Albanian parties. There is a very new factor here which has become

very important, and that is the Kosovar Liberation Army.

They have the guns. They are drawing significant political support,

and I believe that somehow or another they and all Albanians

have now got to be brought into new political groupings. It is my

own view, and I cannot say I am confident in asserting it.

I am asserting it in part because I am trying to see ways of

breaking the political deadlock and getting something going, so I

believe also establishing a new coalition will make the KLA a real

part of the negotiating effort, sort of like the analogy is frequently

made between—I am not sure it is appropriate here. They mention

it between the IRA and Sinn Fein, that there is a political arm

through the armed separatist movement.

Well, if we were to resort to force, if

we felt the compulsion to resort to force, obviously it would be better

to have the United Nations resolution. I think everybody would

welcome that. Unfortunately, there seems to be in my view some

indications that nations are hiding behind this so they do not have

to fight, so they do not have to use force, and expecting the Chinese

and/or the Russians to veto this.

I believe in the end we have to look at how seriously we think

the stakes are. If we think the stakes are extraordinarily important,

that the violence stop and not expand, then I believe we will

have to proceed with friends in Europe. I do not believe we would

be alone, but I believe it is a very major difficulty for NATO.

It is a test for NATO whether NATO is going to stand up and

say they are going to deal with this problem, and I believe in the

end I think most NATO members would go along, but I cannot say

that with great certainty, and obviously I do not have the political

job of making that happen, so it is sort of easy for me to assert

that.

I can only offer you some thoughts. It

is not an area—although I had worked in the Pentagon many years

ago, it is not an area that I feel myself particularly an expert. I

had always felt that the only force we would use if we had to resort

to force was to focus on destroying the infrastructure, the communications,

and the supply depots of the Serbian military police establishment.

I was not focusing on putting troops into Kosovo. I was not in

any way doing that, and I am not—I cannot say how much collateral

damage. I know we did a similar thing in Bosnia with very few

lives being lost. Bosnia is, of course, not Serbia. Serbia has a much

bigger military establishment.

I cannot really answer that with knowledge, and I cannot sit

here and tell you that it is going to work, that a sizable attack will

work.

My own view is that it would, but obviously I cannot tell you that

with certainty. The question is, what are the alternatives, and you

cannot just look at it simply in terms of one way of proceeding.

I mean, if we want certainty, then we can get out of there and

let them fight, but there are all sorts of costs to that, and we lived

through that already, and therefore I believe, while no one certainly

wants to use that option, I believe we have reached the point

where we cannot proceed without getting two things I believe are

essential from Mr. Milosevic who, after all, has the power, which

is an end to the violence now, and an immediate political change

in Kosovo.

I am not trying to determine what that political change should

be, but that is something which has to be discussed and, as I said

before, I think the only way to achieve that is if the West proposes

a settlement.

That is a very good question. I do not

feel knowledgeable enough about that to answer. My own instincts

are that if we get those two things from Milosevic I believe we have

the capacity to persuade the Albanians to go along with that. If we

do not, we are in pretty sad shape.

No. I am expressing both. I think

there is an extraordinary important humanitarian concern, but in

a way, more important as a policy, looking at it from a policy sense,

I think you have just very well described what is involved.

It involves the cohesion of the alliance, the seeds of a possible

wider conflict—both of those are inherently involved in this issue,

and we do not know right now how this is going to play out, and

I do not think we should take the risk of those two things occurring.

But—and you also pointed out, and I could not agree with you

more and I would argue it is one of the reasons, notwithstanding

our leadership ultimately in Bosnia, that the French and the Germans

acted, and that is that if, in fact, there is a exodus of people,

and if there is a refugee problem, that gets the attention of our European

friends.

Particularly if you tell them to go on

to Germany.

Obviously, like you, I certainly would

not like to see that, but I believe the stakes are such—and let me

back track for a minute, and I cannot dispute what you said about

the differences between bombing Serbia and bombing in Bosnia.

I believe the stakes are such that if we cannot get him to agree

to what I think are the indispensable requirements, that we have

two choices, one of which we must do. One is to use air power, and

the other is to undermine him and support the KLA. We have to

do one or both of them.

I think the more we dawdle, the more

likely the developments are in the direction of Greater Albania.

I applaud his statement, but he is, of

course, not in a very strong position.

Yes, I do, and you have very well stated

the dilemma. There are two views. One is that it will cause the

Serbian people, the Serbian military to rally around him, and the

other is that it will demonstrate the terrible dilemma that he has

led his country into.

If I could tell you a brief story, I saw a very prominent Serbian

political leader back in 1995 to try to ask him his perspective on

what happened when the war in Yugoslavia, in the former Yugoslavia

began, and I said to him, tell me, if in 1992 NATO had—

and this was a man very close to Milosevic during that whole period.

If, at that time in 1992, NATO had sent an unmistakable message

to you, or had begun to sort of mobilize forces, would you have

started or continued the war, and he looked at me and laughed,

and he said, are you out of your mind? Do you think we want a

war with NATO?

That is basically my perspective on it.

Well, I have a perspective on that that

may be wrong. I think the reticence is great because we have reticence,

and if we are certain as to what we are about, if we can clarify

our thinking on how to deal with this, I believe that would

change things. The Europeans are reticent because we are, and as

I said before, I am not sure where we are at.

I mean, I would hope that obviously that our diplomacy succeeds,

but right now I do not know what we are trying to do.